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This paper revisits the association between investment and growth. The empirical findings highlight
substantial heterogeneity for the effect of investment on growth and suggest a possible negative association.
Results based on a battery of cross-sectional and time-series regressions show that the link between
investment and growth has weakened over time and that investment in high-income countries is more
likely to have a negative effect on growth. The adverse effect for high-income countries appears to
have increased over time. An implication is that uphill capital flows could be associated with negative
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1.   Introduction 
  This paper revisits the association between investment and growth. In the context of 
neoclassical growth theory and a canonical concave production function, marginal returns to 
capital are presumed to be positive but to diminish as the capital-output ratio rises.  As capital-
output ratios rise, and countries grow richer over time, the effect of lagged investment on growth 
should diminish and could even turn negative. An implication is that public policy designed to 
promote growth via stimulating investment could be ineffective; especially for high-income 
countries. 
 
Diminishing returns are a property of production relationships and this property is 
independent of the source of savings that make investment possible.  Investment matched by 
either foreign or domestic savings would depress marginal returns. Recently, there have been a 
few empirical studies examining effects of foreign savings on domestic growth; or alternatively, 
the link between current account imbalances and growth.
1   In this paper, we investigate the 
direct evidence of the marginal effect of investment on growth and whether high and low income 
countries experience the same or similar effect. 
   
There are reasons to doubt that we will observe zero or negative returns to investment.  One 
motivation for international capital flows is presumably to arbitrage the returns offered by 
domestic and foreign markets. The well-documented pattern of capital flows from poor to rich 
countries (going back to Feldstein and Horioka, 1980), and among poor countries from rapidly 
growing economies to slowly growing economies (Gorinchas and Jeanne, 2007), however, has 
cast considerable doubt on the view that savings follow returns across national borders.  There is 
now a substantial literature on distortions to cross-border capital flows that might generate zero 
or negative returns on capital in individual countries.
2  
 
Even if investment follows return opportunities a large influx of capital could depress returns 
in the presence of diminishing returns to scale. To further complicate the situation, the actual 
                                                            
1   See, for example, Aizenman et al (2004), Prasad et al. (2007) 
2   See, for example, Taylor (1996), French and Poterba (1999), Portes and Rey (2005), Nieuwerburgh and 
Veldkamp (2009). 2 
 
capital flow and hence investment could be driven by non-profit considerations including the 
saving gluts story. If the non-profit driven capital flows are quantitatively important, the 
observed link between investment and growth could be weakened. We briefly review some of 
these possibilities in the next section.  
 
There are reservations on the research strategy of using direct econometric tests to detect the 
relationship between investment and growth.  Barro (2008), for example, argues that two-way 
causation between investment and growth could make direct econometric evaluation of limited 
value.  The alternative strategy for evaluating the contribution of investment to growth is growth 
accounting where the causation problem is sidestepped at the cost of assuming that aggregate 
payments to factors of production are determined by their marginal products.
3  
 
The empirical research that has looked at econometric evidence is quite mixed.  In the 
examination of a cross-section of countries, Houthakker (1961), Modigliani (1970) and Carroll 
and Weil (1994) find a positive association between investment and growth. Barro (1991) and 
Barro and Lee (1993) also obtain a positive coefficient using a growth-regression approach. In 
contrast, Attanasio, Picci and Scorcu (2000) conduct a battery of Granger causality tests in a 
panel setting to find that lagged investment rate Granger-causes growth rate with a negative sign. 
Unlike the previous studies, these authors also emphasize the importance of time-series over 
cross-sectional asymptotics. Finally, using a panel regression approach, Aghion, Comin and 
Howitt (2006) find that a higher savings rate is associated with higher growth in poorer countries 
while the association is significantly smaller and only marginally statistically significant for 
richer countries.   
 
                                                            
3   In a recent review, Hulton (2009) observes “(T)he non-parametric (non-econometric) nature of growth 
accounting is made possible by the assumption of competitive markets in which prices are equal to marginal cost. In 
this case, cost shares are equal to the corresponding output elasticities. This equality does not hold in non-
competitive markets where prices are likely to deviate from marginal cost.” Clearly, if we assume capital is paid its 
marginal product, and capital’s income share of GDP is substantial, it cannot be true that the marginal product of 
capital is zero or negative. But the assumption that the marginal and average products of capital are the same is a 




We adopt an empirical framework that offers some direct inferences regarding the investment 
effect on growth. Data from a large number of countries from 1950 through 2007 are considered. 
To anticipate the results, our cross-sectional regressions show that the investment-growth link is 
quite variable and appears to have weakened over time. The link also displays a discernable 
difference between high and low income countries with high-income countries more likely to 
generate negative growth effects. These results are robust in the presence of the standard control 
variables used in the empirical growth literature. The country-specific regression results affirm 
the heterogeneous investment and growth patterns experienced by different countries – even 
among the G7 countries. 
 
In the next section, we briefly review the link between investment and growth. Section 3 
gives the basic empirical structure and discusses the empirical findings. Some concluding 
remarks are offered in Section 4 
 
2. Investment and Growth 
 
2.1  Are zero or negative returns to investment plausible? 
Conventional assumptions about aggregate production functions include the property 
that, other things equal, the marginal return on investment declines, and at some point turns 
negative, as the capital-output ratio increases. Conventional analysis also suggests that we are 
unlikely to observe investment that generates zero or negative returns. High-income countries, 
with high capital output ratios and capital that incorporates the best technology, are likely to be 
closer to zero or negative marginal products for capital as compared to low-income countries. 
But if there are alternative investment (or storage) strategies that generate positive expected 
returns, we would not often observe investment with negative ex post returns. The obvious 
investment alternative for savings generated in high-income countries is investment in poor 
countries where the marginal return from investment has been assumed to be positive. To be 
sure, returns are uncertain and negative ex post returns might occasionally be observed, but 
average returns over the business cycle are generally assumed to be positive. 
 4 
 
Gordon Getty (2010a, 2010b) has challenged these assumptions by asking a 
straightforward question. What direct evidence do we have concerning the relationship for the 
United States between changes in savings or investment ratios and the subsequent behavior of 
growth rates? His interpretation of US data is that there is no evidence that increases in savings 
rates or investment rates are associated with subsequent increases in income growth rates. That 
is, the marginal contribution to growth of unusually high rates of investment is zero. His 
interpretation of the evidence is that US savings behavior is not a constraint on economic growth 
and that public policies designed to raise savings rates are misguided. 
 
Even though increases in productivity might cause savings, investment and subsequent 
growth rates to rise, the reverse causation from savings and investment to growth is not at all 
obvious. Getty (2010b), for example, quotes John Stuart Mill (1848): 
 
 “If it were said, for instance, that the only way to accelerate the increase of capital is by increase of saving, 
the idea would probably be suggested of greater abstinence, and increased privation. But it is obvious that 
whatever increases the productive power of labor creates an additional fund to make savings from, and 
enables capital to be enlarged not only without additional privation, but concurrently with an increase of 
personal consumption.” 
 
Our approach to the problem is to assume that it is possible that investment booms in 
high-income countries are associated with increases in savings and investment that are not a 




2.2   Capital flows and growth 
In an environment where international capital flows are widely associated with bad 
outcomes for investment in high-income countries, we find the lack of direct tests of the 
relationship between investment and growth surprising. A number of distortions to private 
investment decisions might generate aggregate negative returns.  One interpretation of recent 
history for high-income countries (Bernanke et al., 2011) is that savings gluts in the rest of the 
world or shifts in portfolio preferences for US assets by private (Caballero et al., 2006) or 5 
 
official investors (Dooley et al., 2003, 2009) have pushed foreign savings into the US.
4 This 
inflow of foreign savings reduced the incentives for US government and private savings, but the 
offset was incomplete, and the resulting level of investment caused marginal returns to 
investment to fall. The fact that US real interest rates have remained quite low by historical 
standards throughout the period seems to us consistent with this hypothesis.  
 
The implications of “uphill” capital flows for subsequent growth performance are 
obvious. Foreign savings attracted by high expected returns are likely to contribute to growth. 
Foreign savings attracted by other factors depress returns, and if these other factors are powerful 
enough, could be associated with zero or negative expected returns.  
 
A related idea is that the inflow of foreign savings not only depressed expected real yields 
in the US but also overwhelmed in an unexpected manner the ability of the US financial system 
to efficiently and honestly intermediate the augmented flow of savings. In this interpretation 
productive investment opportunities are available but the financial system is unable or lacks the 
incentives to find them. The negative externality from an increased flow of savings and 
investments can generate negative ex post rates of return on investment. In this view savings 
were misallocated and the recent financial crisis was the inevitable result of the capital losses 
generated by ex post valuation of investment projects.  
 
Another line of research suggests that various types of distortions turn investment booms 
into growth busts (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). Moreover, investors fail to learn through 
experience. These arguments are largely based on historical analysis of financial crises and their 
antecedents. The idea that investment booms, particularly in housing, have been generated by 
speculative bubbles, unsustainable government subsidies or distortions in financial markets has 
dominated recent discussions of the subprime crisis.  
 
In this paper we do not distinguish among the many possible reasons why investment 





crisis. We do test the idea that some unknown cause of unproductive investment has generated 
over time increasingly weak and finally negative returns for investment in high-income 
countries. The implication would be that the subprime crisis may have been the most recent 
manifestation of a secular trend in investment returns for high-income countries.  
 
To explore Getty’s conjecture that savings are not a constraint on growth we conduct an 
extensive battery of econometric tests both for US data and for a large sample of rich and poor 
countries. We consider both cross-section and time-series evidence. Our priors are that it is 
important to consider high- and low-income countries as having different characteristics. This is 
clearly the case for studies of the convergence hypothesis. The empirical literature on 
convergence tests the prediction that investment returns are higher in poor relative to rich 
countries. If this is the case, similar rates of investment will eventually lead to a convergence of 
per capita income. The conventional result from that literature is that there is some support for 
the convergence hypothesis within groups of poor and rich countries but not between these 
groups. In this paper we investigate the possibility that within the high-income group 
convergence is associated with zero or even negative marginal contributions to growth from 
investment. This is a different type of convergence in that the high-income countries are moving 
back to the pack.  
 
 
3.   The Results 
 
3.1 Data 
The baseline regression uses country level data on real gross domestic product at 
purchasing power parity per capita (henceforth GDP for brevity) and investment share in GDP. 
Annual data from 1950 to 2007 and on up to 188 countries were retrieved from the Penn World 
Tables, Version 6.3 (Heston and Aten, 2009).  
 
Some control variables are employed to evaluate the robustness of the baseline regression 
results. They include a) economic openness (openness) given by the ratio of export and import 7 
 
volume to GDP, b) the ratio of general government consumption to GDP (govtcons), c) annual 
percentage change in consumer prices (inflation), d) secondary school enrollment rate among 
male population (schooling), e) infant mortality rate per 1,000 live births (mortality), and f) total 
births per woman in logarithm (fertility); see, for example, Barro (1991) and Barro and i Martin 
(2003). These data were obtained from the World Bank World Development Indicators database. 
In addition, we consider the political stability indicator, Polity2 , that is defined by the difference 
between institutional autocracy and institutional democracy scores; these scores assume a value 
between -10 to 10. The data on Polity2 are from the Marshall and Jaggers (2002). Table 1 
summarizes the variables used in the regression analysis and their sources.  
 
3.2 Bivariate  Regression 
Let yj be country j’s average annual GDP growth over an n-year period and ij be the 
average of its annual investment share in GDP in the same n-year period. The basic growth-
investment regression is given by the bivariate equation: 
 
yj = α + βij,-n + ε j,          ( 1 )  
 
where the β coefficient gives the lagged investment effect on growth and ε is the regression error. 
The use of lagged investment in the regression is meant to alleviate the possible feedback effect 
between growth and investment so that the β coefficient could be properly interpreted as the 
growth effect of investment.  
 
Table 2 summarizes the cross-sectional regression results based on equation (1) using 
non-overlapping data with a three-year sampling window (n = 3).  The year-heading gives the 
last year of the sampling window. Essentially, the results are in accordance with the notion that 
(lagged) investment promotes growth; the investment share coefficient estimates are mostly 
positive. For the 18 cross-sectional regression estimates, 10 are positive and statistically 
significant. Note that the investment effect on growth has declined over time and become 
statistically insignificant after 1995.  
 8 
 
The explanatory power given by the adjusted R-squared estimate is quite high for the 
1956 regression – the investment share explains 31.6% of the variation in GDP. The adjusted R-
squared estimate, however, tends to decline over time and is less than 2% after the 1995 
regression. Both the coefficient estimates and the R-squared estimates suggest that the link 
between investment and growth has weakened over time.
5 
 
3.3  High-Income vs. Low-Income Countries 
  As noted in Section 2, investment in high-income and low-income countries could have 
different implications for growth. To allow for the differential effects, we consider the cross-
sectional regression specification: 
 
yj = α + 1 Dj + βij,-n + 2 (Dj  ij,-n) + ε j.       ( 2 )  
 
The zero-one dummy variable Dj is deployed to differentiate the growth behaviors of high and 
low income countries; Dj is set to 1 if country j’s GDP is above the cross-sectional sample mean 
during that year and to 0 otherwise.
6 The interaction variable Dj  ij,-n captures the (additional) 
marginal effect of investment on growth, given by 2, experienced by high-income countries. 
Under (2), the marginal growth effect of investment is given by β + 2Dj ( ∂yj ⁄∂ij,-n) and of 
being a high income country is given by 1+ 2 ij,-n ( ∂yj ⁄∂Dj).  
 
Table 3 presents the results controlling for high-income country effects based on 
specification (2). Compared with the baseline specification, the inclusion of the two high-income 
related terms tends to improve the explanatory power, as proxied by the adjusted R-squared. 
High income countries, on the average, have high growth rates. The dummy variable Dj always 
yields a positive coefficient estimate and 12 of these 18 estimates are statistically significant. 
                                                            
5   Table A1 in the appendix presents analogous cross-section regression results based on the sampling 
window of n = 5. These results are qualitatively similar. We also considered the cases of n equals 2 and 10; the 
results based on these sampling windows are again qualitatively similar to those reported in text and are available 
upon request. 
6   The use of sample median instead of sample mean gives similar results. 9 
 
Perhaps, a more interesting result is that all the 18 coefficient estimates of the interaction 
variable Dj  ij,-n are negative and are mostly statistically significant.  
 
While the lagged investment itself in general has a positive impact on growth (the β 
estimate has a positive value in 17 of the 18 regressions) investment has a net negative impact on 
growth in high-income countries. The marginal effect of investment for high-income countries, 
measured by the β + 2 estimate, is mostly negative for the 18 cross-sectional samples. In the 
2000s, the interaction variable effect clearly dominates the lagged effect – investment in high-
income countries is negatively associated with future economic growth. 
 
Figure 1 offers a view on the statistical significance and the time profile of the combined 
β + 2 estimates. The figure plots the marginal growth effect of investment, β + 2, from each 
annual cross-sectional regression (with n = 3) along with the associated 95 percent confidence 
interval.
7 The combined β + 2 estimate exhibits a discernible downward trend over time. For the 
sample period up to 2000, the zero mark is within the 95 percent confidence band, indicating that 
up to that period investment has no statistically significant impact for high income countries on 
growth. In contrast, during the 2000s the marginal investment effect is not just negative but is 
also statistically significant. That is, investment in high income countries tends to have a 
significant negative growth effect.  
 
The analogous plot for the case of n = 5 is given in Appendix, Figure A1. The pattern is 
essentially the same as the one in Figure 1. For high income countries, the marginal growth 
effect of investment is negative for most of the sample period with the negative effect being 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level or higher in the 2000s. 
 
The estimation results illustrate the differential investment effects. As discussed in 
Section 2, there are a few possible reasons for growth not responding to investment. Our 
estimation results indicate that the general investment effect on growth (given by the linear β-
estimate) has declined over time while the adverse contribution of the high income dummy 
                                                            
7   The confidence interval takes into account the variances and the covariance of the estimates of β and 2. 10 
 
variable to the investment effect on growth (given by the 2 coefficient on the interaction term) 
holds up quite well. The phenomenon could be due to, for example, a) a reduction of productive 
investment opportunities in high-income countries over time and/or b) some congestion 
externality such as the reduction in the ability of the financial system to intermediate capital to 
productive investment opportunities. The current setting does not allow us to isolate the 
underlying causes of the evolution of investment effects. Nevertheless, it is important to 
document the empirical regularity concerning the declining investment effect on growth and the 
possibility that investment flows into high income countries could have a negative expected 
return. 
  
3.4 Additional  Control  Variables 
Arguably, both specifications (1) and (2) over-simplify growth dynamics since they omit 
some common determinants of cross-country variations in economic growth. To assess the 
robustness of our results, we consider the regression 
 
yj = α + 1 Dj + βij,-n + 2 (Dj  ij,-n) + δControls j,-n + ε j,        ( 3 )  
 
where Controls is a vector containing the relevant control variables and  δ is the corresponding 
coefficient vector. The control variables that are commonly used in cross-country growth 
analysis were listed in Subsection 3.1 and are added to the regression sequentially. The 
estimation results are presented in Table 4. For brevity, we present the results pertaining to the 
cross-sectional analysis based on the annual averages of the 2005 to 2007 period.
8  
 
  Two preliminary observations about the controls are in order. First, these control 
variables as a group help explain growth variation across countries. The adjusted R-squared 
estimates of the benchmark regression (2) are noticeably smaller than the corresponding ones 
reported in Table 4 based on equation (3). The marginal explanatory powers of individual control 
variables, however, depend on the presence of other regressors in the equation. Second, the 
                                                            
8   Qualitatively, the results are similar for other time periods. However, as suggested by Figure 1, the results 
on the parameter 2, that captures the (additional) marginal effect of investment on growth experienced by high 
income countries, are less robust to the inclusion of controls in the earlier time periods. 11 
 
inclusion of the geographic dummy variables (specification (9) in Table 4) does not improve the 
regression performance. After controlling for the relevant economic variables, the Asian 
countries, for example, do not have a stronger or weaker growth.  
 
Next, we move to the interpretation of the coefficients on linear and interaction 
investment terms. The growth effect of investment is reinforced by these control variables: the 
coefficient estimates on the lagged investment variable increases in both magnitude and 
statistical significance with the inclusion of additional country controls. Nevertheless, the 
marginal effect of investment in high-income countries during the 2005-2007 period, as given by 
the β + 2 estimate, remains negative in all specifications reported in Table 4.  
 
The coefficient estimates on the two high-income related explanatory variables remain 
positive and statistically significant in all the specifications. The interaction variable, on the other 
hand, yields a slightly larger (more negative) coefficient estimate in some cases compared to the 
benchmark without control variables. In other words, the adverse investment effect on growth 
experienced by high income countries reported in Table 3 is robust to the inclusion of additional 
economic control variables. Investment in a high-income country could lead to a slow growth 
rate.  The result naturally raises the question: Will a policy of promoting saving and investment 
be effective in pulling the high income countries out of recession in the post 2007 era? 
 
3.5  Results from Time Series Regressions 
The non-overlapping cross-sectional regression results reported in Tables 2 and 3 show 
that, on the average, the investment effect on growth could be negative for high income 
countries. Does an individual country’s own experience give the same inference? To offer an 
alternative perspective on the interpretation of the investment effect on growth, we consider the 
following regression for each country: 
 
yt  = α + β1it,-n + β2 yt,-n + ε t,         ( 4 )  
 12 
 
where the time subscript indicates non-overlapping time series data used. Given the paucity of 
time series data, the lagged growth variable is included to capture factors other than investment 
that affect growth and to minimize the serial correlation in the error term ε t. Table 5 reports the 
results for the 26 OCED countries. To facilitate comparison with results in the previous 
subsections, the sampling window parameter n is set to 3. The countries are ranked by the year 
2000 level of income per capita to shed some light on the implications of income for the 
investment effect on growth. 
 
The positive investment effect is not a common phenomenon for these OECD countries. 
After controlling for the lagged growth effect, lagged investment is found to have a negative 
coefficient estimate for 13 countries and a positive one for the remaining half of the OECD 
countries included in the analysis. The negative coefficient estimates on lagged investment tend 
to concentrate among countries with a higher level of income. For the top 13 high income 
countries, 8 display a negative estimate.  
 
Among the G-7 countries, the four that have the highest incomes (the USA, Canada, 
Germany, and Japan) have a negative investment coefficient estimate and the other three 
(France, Great Britain, and Italy) have a positive one. Indeed, the standard Chow-test results 
indicate that the investment effects of these two groups of G-7 countries are usually different 
from each other. 
 
Table 6 presents results from the 15 fastest growing emerging market economies in the 
sample. These countries are not rich. Investment in these countries, however, does not 
necessarily have a positive growth implication – indeed, investment has a statistically significant 
negative effect in four countries. Thus, investment by itself may not be the main cause of fast 
economic growth.  
 
In passing, we note that similar time series analyses were conducted for other countries. 
Within a selected group of countries, high income countries are more likely to experience a 
negative investment effect on growth. For instance, for a group of 9 selected developing 13 
 
countries with the 2000 per capita income between $2.5K and $9K, only Mexico (income at the 
$9K level) has a negative investment effect on growth. 
 
When we pooled all the data together, the investment variable has a statistically 
significant coefficient estimate of 0.036; that is, on the average over time and across these 
countries, investment has a small positive impact on growth. Of course, the significant pooled 
estimate of 0.036 downplays the heterogeneous investment effect across countries with diverse 
economic and political characteristics.  
 
While the cross-sectional regressions illustrate the different behaviors of high- and low-
income countries on average, the country specific results in Tables 5 and 6 highlight the degree 
of heterogeneity, even among some high income countries. In general, the negative investment 
effect on growth tends to be observed for countries with a high level of income within a selected 
group. In that sense, the findings are in line with the main cross-sectional regression results. 
 
4. Concluding  Remarks 
 
The empirics reported above suggest that the investment effect on growth has declined 
over time to a quite low value in the 2000s. While the average lagged effect of investment on 
growth across all the countries is positive, it is negative for high income countries. For high-
income countries, the negative coefficient on the interaction term high income dummy in the 
growth equation on average dominates so that the combined marginal effect of investment on 
growth is negative throughout most of the sample period and is more negative toward the end of 
the sample time period: the 2000s. This result is robust to the inclusion of other variables that 
have proven useful in cross-section growth studies.  
 
The time series evidence from individual countries illustrates the degree of the 
heterogeneity of investment effect on growth. Within any one of the selected groups discussed in 
the previous section, a higher income country is more likely to display a negative investment 
effect on growth. However, individual time-series results indicate that not all the high income 14 
 
countries display a negative investment effect and not all low income countries have a positive 
effect. The level of income is not likely to be the sole determinant of the direction of the 
investment effect on growth. Nonetheless, the time series evidence is in accordance with cross-
sectional regression results in the sense that, on average, investment has a negative growth effect 
in high-income countries.  
 
Our results show that the investment effect varies over time and across countries. Thus, a 
panel regression approach could lead to biased results. As pointed out in Section 3.5, the pooled 
regression result ignores the heterogeneity of investment effects. Notwithstanding the caveat, we 
note that the β and 2 estimates from estimating equation (3) under a panel data setting are, 
respectively, positive and negative. That is, the results (available upon request) are qualitative 
similar to those reported in Section 3. 
 
The evidence does not support any one theory of why investment in high income 
countries is not associated with growth. However, recent uphill international capital flows to the 
United States may have moved one high-income country to a region of decreasing and even 
negative returns to investment. More generally, a policy of increasing saving and investment is 
not a panacea, especially for high-income countries, for promoting economic growth. 15 
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Tables and Figures: 
Table 1: Variable definitions and sources 
Variable: Description: Source:
Real  GDP  per capita Real  PPP adjusted GDP  per capita, unit  % Penn  World  Tables  (PWT) Version  6.3
Investment share Investment share  of real PPP adjusted GDP  per capita, unit  % Penn  World  Tables  (PWT) Version  6.3
High income  dummy If GDP per capita is above that year’s sample mean Authors’ calculations
Inflation Inflation, consumption prices  (annual %) World  Development Indicators (WDI), World  Bank Data
Govtcons General  government final consumption expenditure (% GDP) World  Development Indicators (WDI), World  Bank Data
Mortality Infant mortality rate  (per 1000 live birth) World  Development Indicators (WDI), World  Bank Data
Fertility Log of total birth per woman World  Development Indicators (WDI), World  Bank Data
Schooling Secondary school enrollment, male (% of gross) World  Development Indicators (WDI), World  Bank Data
Openness Imports + Exports (% GDP) World  Development Indicators (WDI), World  Bank Data
Polity2 Political stability indicator Polity  IV project,  Marshall and  Jaggers  (2002)
institutionalized autocracy minus democracy score (-10 to 10)  
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Table 2: Cross-sectional regression results; n = 3. Dependent variable: 3-year average real GDP 
per capita growth rate 
1956 1959 1962 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980
Investment Share(-3) 0.136*** 0.011 0.008 0.120*** 0.098*** 0.133*** 0.115*** 0.024 0.119***
(0.022) (0.036) (0.028) (0.032) (0.026) (0.031) (0.042) (0.030) (0.037)
Constant 0.013** 0.042*** 0.037*** 0.022*** 0.041*** 0.056*** 0.078*** 0.083*** 0.074***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
Observations 64 71 75 113 113 113 163 163 163
Adjusted R-squared 0.316 -0.012 -0.013 0.147 0.096 0.157 0.044 -0.003 0.048
1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007
Investment Share(-3) 0.027 0.046* 0.074** 0.091** 0.058* 0.023 0.055 -0.039 0.037
(0.043) (0.025) (0.031) (0.038) (0.033) (0.039) (0.052) (0.034) (0.029)
Constant 0.048*** 0.025*** 0.035*** 0.005 0.016** 0.026*** 0.033*** 0.060*** 0.069***
(0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.006)
Observations 163 163 163 165 176 187 187 188 188
Adjusted R-squared -0.002 0.009 0.032 0.027 0.021 -0.003 0.015 0.005 0.007  
Notes: Results of estimating (1) in the text with n = 3 are reported. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 19 
 
Table 3: Cross-sectional regression results – high income versus low income countries; n = 3. 
Dependent variable: 3-year average real GDP per capita growth rate. 
1956 1959 1962 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980
Investment Share(-3) 0.144*** 0.009 0.001 0.165*** 0.115*** 0.133** 0.159*** 0.068* 0.163***
(0.023) (0.051) (0.031) (0.050) (0.032) (0.058) (0.042) (0.038) (0.042)
High Income Dummy 0.025*** 0.012 0.031*** 0.041*** 0.007 0.013 0.086*** 0.027 0.086***
(0.009) (0.018) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.019) (0.024) (0.018)
Dummy x Investment Share(-3) -0.086** -0.028 -0.069* -0.184*** -0.045 -0.036 -0.290*** -0.142* -0.282***
(0.035) (0.067) (0.041) (0.051) (0.041) (0.056) (0.064) (0.080) (0.066)
Constant 0.009* 0.041*** 0.032*** 0.017** 0.039*** 0.055*** 0.067*** 0.078*** 0.061***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Observations 64 71 75 113 113 113 163 163 163
Adjusted R-squared 0.365 -0.031 0.067 0.216 0.087 0.146 0.159 0.011 0.181
1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007
Investment Share(-3) 0.055 0.075*** 0.073** 0.078* 0.102*** 0.023 0.07 -0.006 0.054
(0.050) (0.026) (0.035) (0.044) (0.036) (0.049) (0.074) (0.034) (0.036)
High Income Dummy 0.002 0.043*** 0.061*** 0.039*** 0.043*** 0.013 0.038*** 0.081*** 0.048***
(0.019) (0.015) (0.023) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016) (0.012) (0.020) (0.010)
Dummy x Investment Share(-3) -0.074 -0.170*** -0.149* -0.079** -0.147*** -0.03 -0.122* -0.266*** -0.164***
(0.068) (0.049) (0.087) (0.039) (0.047) (0.061) (0.064) (0.077) (0.038)
Constant 0.047*** 0.018*** 0.027*** 0.000 0.006 0.024** 0.028** 0.050*** 0.063***
(0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.008) (0.007)
Observations 163 163 163 165 176 187 187 188 188
Adjusted R-squared 0.011 0.07 0.132 0.046 0.097 -0.01 0.035 0.129 0.063  
Notes: Results of estimating (2) in the text with n = 3 are reported. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
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Table 4: Cross-sectional regression results – the 2005-2007 sampling window. Dependent 
variable: 3-year average real GDP per capita growth rate 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Investment Share(-3) 0.054 0.074* 0.119*** 0.110*** 0.112*** 0.100** 0.105*** 0.109** 0.099*
(0.036) (0.040) (0.035) (0.037) (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.049) (0.052)
High Income Dummy 0.048*** 0.049*** 0.054*** 0.047*** 0.049*** 0.044*** 0.047*** 0.033*** 0.034***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.010) (0.011)
Dummy x Investment Share(-3) -0.164*** -0.187*** -0.210*** -0.207*** -0.209*** -0.195*** -0.201*** -0.173*** -0.170***
(0.038) (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.042) (0.046) (0.048) (0.041) (0.042)
Openness(-3) 0.015*** 0.012** 0.013** 0.012* 0.01 0.015** 0.009 0.009
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Govtcons(-3) -0.072 -0.092* -0.111** -0.103* -0.107** -0.105* -0.104
(0.046) (0.048) (0.053) (0.054) (0.054) (0.057) (0.070)
Schooling(-3) 0.018 0.016 -0.002 0.019 0.022 0.021
(0.014) (0.014) (0.019) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026)
Inflation(-3) 0.008 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.002
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Fertility(-3) -0.015 -0.032** -0.051*** -0.054***
(0.012) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013)










Constant 0.063*** 0.050*** 0.054*** 0.047*** 0.051*** 0.082*** 0.061** 0.085*** 0.087***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.027) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030)
Observations 188 177 172 153 144 143 141 119 119
Adjusted R-squared 0.063 0.114 0.162 0.16 0.146 0.145 0.181 0.303 0.287  
Notes: Results of estimating (3) in the text with n = 3 are reported. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 21 
 
 
Table 5: Country-Specific Regression Results – OECD Countries. Dependent variable: 3-year 
average real GDP per capita growth rate. 
Sample: 2000 GDP/capita Inv. Share (t-3) S.E. Growth Rate (t-3) S.E Constant S.E. Obs. Adj. R2
LUX $54,109 -0.553*** (0.065) -0.291*** (0.098) 0.245*** (0.026) 18 0.207
USA $34,608 -0.256* (0.139) 0.693*** (0.061) 0.072** (0.028) 18 0.522
NOR $34,524 0.044 (0.123) 0.478*** (0.124) 0.018 (0.046) 18 0.134
CHE $29,877 -0.272 (0.177) 0.539*** (0.113) 0.110** (0.054) 18 0.291
IRL $28,310 0.138 (0.143) 0.135 (0.152) 0.021 (0.033) 18 0.022
NLD $27,983 0.207*** (0.060) 0.563*** (0.087) -0.03 (0.018) 18 0.382
ISL $27,664 0.299** (0.137) -0.104 (0.096) -0.034 (0.051) 18 -0.007
AUT $27,575 -0.184 (0.156) 0.751*** (0.106) 0.067* (0.039) 18 0.472
CAN $26,685 -0.835** (0.341) 0.398*** (0.099) 0.237*** (0.081) 18 0.397
DNK $26,129 0.031 (0.073) 0.460*** (0.156) 0.025*** (0.010) 18 0.105
BEL $26,073 -0.033 (0.280) 0.474*** (0.058) 0.041 (0.072) 18 0.118
JPN $25,126 -0.113* (0.061) 0.746*** (0.070) 0.053*** (0.015) 18 0.581
AUS $24,825 -0.227 (0.240) 0.431*** (0.081) 0.1 (0.071) 18 0.100
SWE $24,614 0.171* (0.089) 0.489*** (0.047) -0.01 (0.021) 18 0.216
FRA $23,981 0.308** (0.133) 0.538*** (0.085) -0.053** (0.027) 18 0.510
GBR $23,764 0.219 (0.225) 0.565*** (0.078) -0.018 (0.045) 18 0.295
FIN $23,709 0.174** (0.068) 0.026 (0.067) 0.005 (0.019) 18 -0.077
ITA $23,572 0.14 (0.085) 0.493*** (0.118) -0.011 (0.036) 18 0.215
ESP $21,345 -0.024 (0.109) 0.196 (0.209) 0.065*** (0.024) 18 -0.088
ISR $20,221 0.059 (0.103) 0.14 (0.128) 0.036 (0.025) 18 -0.095
NZL $18,366 -0.406*** (0.147) 0.023 (0.027) 0.151*** (0.037) 18 0.049
GRC $17,737 0.232*** (0.084) 0.169 (0.138) -0.011 (0.023) 18 0.354
PRT $16,919 -0.227 (0.211) 0.289*** (0.063) 0.114* (0.062) 18 0.111
KOR $16,890 -0.071* (0.041) 0.643*** (0.082) 0.055*** (0.019) 17 0.318
HUN $11,329 0.198 (0.128) 0.402* (0.216) -0.007 (0.021) 12 0.135
POL $9,486 -0.741*** (0.251) 0.434** (0.202) 0.201*** (0.047) 12 0.080  
Notes: Results of estimating (4) in the text with n = 3 are reported. Robust and autocorrelation corrected (HAC) 
standard errors are given in parentheses. HAC was estimated using the Parzen kernel and the lag parameter chosen 
by the Newey-West method. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Only countries with 
10 or more non-overlapping observations are included. 22 
 
Table 6: Country-Specific Regression Results – the 15 Fastest Growing Emerging Countries. 
Dependent variable: 3-year average real GDP per capita growth rate. 
Sample: Inv. Share (t-3) S.E. Growth Rate (t-3) S.E Constant S.E. Obs. Adjusted R2
GNQ 0.657*** (0.099) -0.277*** (0.099) 0.038 (0.025) 15 0.486
KNA -0.432*** (0.082) -0.084 (0.129) 0.268*** (0.049) 12 0.282
MAC -0.553*** (0.140) 0.436*** (0.121) 0.155*** (0.017) 12 0.149
MDV 2.774*** (0.364) -0.230*** (0.056) -0.781*** (0.117) 12 0.019
TWN -0.021 (0.108) 0.704*** (0.125) 0.029*** (0.009) 18 0.399
CHN 0.246*** (0.069) 0.220*** (0.064) 0.014 (0.013) 18 0.031
BWA 0.244*** (0.047) 0.053 (0.139) 0.033 (0.025) 15 -0.055
BTN 0.233*** (0.041) -0.755*** (0.229) 0.045 (0.036) 12 0.442
HKG -0.033 (0.082) 0.458* (0.235) 0.059 (0.043) 15 0.075
SGP -0.032 (0.027) 0.338*** (0.100) 0.076*** (0.012) 15 -0.039
KOR -0.071* (0.041) 0.643*** (0.082) 0.055*** (0.019) 17 0.318
GRD -0.257*** (0.022) -0.034 (0.050) 0.221*** (0.005) 12 0.604  
Notes: Results of estimating (4) in the text with n = 3 are reported. Robust and autocorrelation corrected (HAC) 
standard errors are given in parentheses. HAC was estimated using the Parzen kernel and the lag parameter chosen 
by the Newey-West method. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Only countries with 




Figure 1: The marginal growth effect of investment given by β + 2 and its 95% confidence 
interval; n = 3 
 
 
Notes: The figure plots the marginal growth effect of investment, β + 2, from each annual cross-sectional 
regression (with n = 3) based on equation (2) along with the associated 95 percent confidence interval. The 















As a robustness check, the appendix presents some cross-sectional results based on the sampling 
window of 5 years; that is n = 5. 
Table A1: Cross-sectional regression results; n = 5. Dependent variable: 5-year average real 
GDP per capita growth rate. 
1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007
Investment Share(-5) 0.111*** 0.001 0.101*** 0.104*** 0.065** 0.076** 0.063** 0.062** 0.033 0.006 0.001
(0.021) (0.028) (0.020) (0.028) (0.026) (0.033) (0.029) (0.027) (0.032) (0.025) (0.025)
Constant 0.020*** 0.038*** 0.029*** 0.057*** 0.087*** 0.070*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.027*** 0.034*** 0.070***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006)
Observations 62 71 113 113 163 163 163 164 176 187 188
Adjusted R-squared 0.268 -0.014 0.189 0.14 0.025 0.036 0.024 0.018 0.005 -0.005 -0.005  
Notes: Results of estimating (1) in the text with n = 5 are reported. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 25 
 
 
Table A2: Cross-sectional regression results – high income versus low income countries; n = 5. 
Dependent variable: 5-year average real GDP per capita growth rate. 
1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007
Investment Share(-5) 0.130*** -0.009 0.121*** 0.103** 0.114*** 0.106** 0.092*** 0.063* 0.071** 0.014 0.033
(0.029) (0.027) (0.031) (0.051) (0.027) (0.042) (0.031) (0.036) (0.029) (0.034) (0.030)
High Income  Dummy 0.018** 0.027** 0.017** 0.017** 0.050*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.050*** 0.035*** 0.050** 0.062***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.008) (0.021) (0.010)
Dummy  x Investment Share(-5) -0.078** -0.054 -0.081** -0.05 -0.206*** -0.169*** -0.157*** -0.110** -0.125*** -0.146* -0.202***
(0.033) (0.040) (0.032) (0.036) (0.035) (0.053) (0.046) (0.055) (0.033) (0.081) (0.038)
Constant 0.017*** 0.032*** 0.027*** 0.056*** 0.079*** 0.064*** 0.014** 0.014* 0.019*** 0.029*** 0.059***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Observations 62 71 113 113 163 163 163 164 176 187 188
Adjusted R-squared 0.286 0.103 0.211 0.137 0.132 0.105 0.105 0.102 0.075 0.088 0.128  
Notes: Results of estimating (2) in the text with n = 5 are reported. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. 




Table A3: Cross-sectional regression results – the 2003-2007 sampling window. Dependent 
variable: 5-year average real GDP per capita growth rate. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Investment Share(-5) 0.033 0.060* 0.101*** 0.091** 0.077** 0.063 0.084** 0.086 0.061
(0.030) (0.036) (0.032) (0.036) (0.038) (0.041) (0.042) (0.057) (0.065)
High Income Dummy 0.062*** 0.063*** 0.070*** 0.068*** 0.066*** 0.059*** 0.064*** 0.048*** 0.045***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012)
Dummy x Investment Share(-5) -0.202*** -0.234*** -0.264*** -0.263*** -0.257*** -0.239*** -0.259*** -0.211*** -0.192***
(0.038) (0.040) (0.038) (0.042) (0.042) (0.050) (0.052) (0.050) (0.052)
Openness(-5) 0.010** 0.009* 0.008 0.006 0.004 0.007 0.004 0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Govtcons(-5) -0.084** -0.098** -0.083* -0.063 -0.063 -0.111** -0.089
(0.041) (0.041) (0.050) (0.051) (0.046) (0.051) (0.061)
Schooling(-5) 0.007 0.005 -0.016 0.007 0.011 0.007
(0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
Inflation(-5) 0.002 0.002 -0.005 -0.007 -0.008
(0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
Fertility(-5) -0.018 -0.035** -0.057*** -0.058***
(0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014)










Constant 0.059*** 0.049*** 0.057*** 0.059*** 0.063*** 0.098*** 0.071*** 0.099*** 0.102***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028)
Observations 188 178 172 157 144 144 142 120 120
Adjusted R-squared 0.128 0.158 0.194 0.174 0.157 0.167 0.202 0.306 0.294  
Notes: Results of estimating (3) in the text with n = 5 are reported. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
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Figure A1: The marginal growth effect of investment given by β + 2 and its 95% confidence 
interval; n = 5 
 
.  
Notes: The figure plots the marginal growth effect of investment, β + 2, from each annual cross-sectional 
regression (with n = 5) based on equation (2) along with the associated 95 percent confidence interval. The 
confidence interval takes into account the variances and the covariance of the estimates of β and 2. 
 